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Nigerian Pension Reform 2004-2010: 
Great Leap or Inappropriate Policy Design?*
Jörg Michael Dostal**
Abstract: This paper analyses early results of the 2004 Nigerian pension
reform. At the beginning of 2010, the new system of privately managed, funded
pension accounts covered around four million Nigerians in a country with a
workforce of around 50 million people. The study focuses on shortcomings of
the new system. Most crucially, the reform has failed to contribute to basic
social security in old age for the majority of Nigerians employed in the informal
sector. Moreover, the minority of covered workers are also likely to experience
problems. The study demonstrates in a model calculation that the funded
accounts have so far produced negative real returns for pension savers. It is sug-
gested that shortcomings of the current system are unlikely to be addressed by
reform within the existing paradigm and that alternative policies, such as non-
contributory universal social pensions, should be considered to expand basic
social security in the Nigerian context.
Keywords: basic social security agenda, Nigeria, pension reform, social pensions
INTRODUCTION
The question of how to use social policies to link successful economic develop-
ment with effective poverty reduction is at the core of contemporary political debate.
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One particular feature of this debate is the focus on policy learning and policy transfer
in the context of comparative country studies. An important starting point is that poli-
cy learning is most appropriate for countries that share certain regime characteristics,
or at least display similar levels of economic development. It is therefore problematic
to compare developing countries with more advanced transition countries or countries
that are members of the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment), and drawing lessons across the divide might be difficult or simply inappro-
priate (Barr and Diamond 2009, 18, 24-26; Kpessa 2010). Nevertheless, analysts and
policy-makers frequently focus on countries that appear to have made transitions
between developmental stages.
The current paper focuses on one such case: the 2004 Nigerian pension reform.
This reform was inspired by the experience of Chile, an economically more advanced
country, whose 1981 pension reform Nigerian policy-makers attempted to replicate
(Orifowomo 2006; Casey and Dostal 2008). Nigerian policy-makers believed that the
reform undertaken in Chile—the shift from a public defined-benefit (DB) system to a
private system of individual funded accounts along the lines of defined contributions
(DC)—would make it possible to address economic development and social security
objectives at the same time. This study argues, however, that Nigerian policy-makers
learned inappropriate and dated lessons from Chile. In addition, it will be shown that
Nigeria lacks the necessary preconditions for a system of funded pension accounts to
work in the long run, in particular developed and well-regulated capital markets that
could assimilate pension savings. The paper then suggests appropriate policy alterna-
tives for Nigeria, namely to refocus pension policy on basic social objectives in order
to expand pension coverage through non-contributory social pensions. Although it
does not offer a blueprint for Nigerian social pension policies, it makes the case for
them to be developed in the near future to serve as an alternative to the current system,
which is likely to remain unsuccessful on both economic and social grounds.
The subsequent argument is divided into five sections. The first section briefly
sketches the outcome of the 1981 Chilean pension reform that served as a model to be
copied in Nigeria. The second section explains the preparation and introduction of
Nigerian pension reform. The third section analyses the debate about funded pensions,
capital market development, and economic growth as far as it is applicable to the
Nigerian case. The fourth section examines the potential of universal social pensions
to alleviate poverty in low- and low-to-middle-income countries with major relevance
for Nigeria. The fifth section provides an empirical account of the first six years of
Nigerian pension reform (from mid-2004 to mid-2010) based on the relevant available
open sources. A brief conclusion sums up the argument.
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THE CHILEAN MODEL OF PENSION REFORM
During the 1990s, the 1981 Chilean pension reform—which involved replacing an
earlier pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) and public pension system with a new compulsory
system of individual funded and privately managed pension accounts based on defined-
contribution principles—has been credited with linking old age social security with
the facilitation of macroeconomic growth. World Bank personnel in particular sug-
gested that the Chilean case proved that a shift of pension provisions from the public
to the private sector and from pay-as-you-go to defined contributions would maintain
social protection while increasing economic growth via the deepening of financial
markets (World Bank 1994, 212-13).
However, the World Bank’s earlier advocacy of private funded pensions has now
lost its appeal for a number of reasons. First, the Chilean reform proved to be much
less successful than was originally assumed. Although the Chilean system succeeded
in making a large share of workers formally subscribe to individual funded pension
accounts, the level and length of contributions and subsequent expected pension pay-
ments remained on average quite low. In fact, the system delivered poverty pensions
rather than old age security to most contributors. In reaction to the coverage gaps of
the funded system, the former center-left Chilean government decided to phase in a
new public and tax-financed basic social pension system (Pensión Básica Solidaria) in
order to provide additional income for current and future pensioners with very small
funded pensions (Riesco 2009).
Second, claims about the contribution of Chilean pension funds to macroeconomic
growth have also become more modest over time. Commentators instead have empha-
sized that the regulatory environment in which pension funds operate provides the
most crucial variable to explain macroeconomic success or failure (Davis 1995, ch.
11; Barr and Diamond 2008; Iglesias 2009). Third, later stages of the Chilean reform
demonstrated that high transition costs in paying for the winding down of the pre-1981
pay-as-you-go system, currently more than 40 percent of the Chilean government
social budget, worked to crowd out other social spending. Hence Illanes and Riesco
concluded:
The Chilean pension system is not really a privately administrated, individual
account based, fixed contribution, etc. system, but a mixed, public-private sys-
tem instead. A major part of the workforce depends today, and will rely in the
future, on the non-contributory, State financed, public pension pillar of the sys-
tem, for the major part of their pensions (Illanes and Riesco 2007, 668).1
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1. For additional discussion, see pages 649-51 and 666-69 in the same volume.
In sum, and pointing toward lessons beyond the case of Chile, analyses of funded
pension systems have suffered because they evaluated the systems in isolation from
economic and social contexts. Measuring the fairness of a funded pension system—by
the extent to which it directly links contributions with benefits—ignores insurance and
redistributive goals that tend to re-emerge on the policy-making agenda once the
extreme inequalities of that approach become salient:
There is no efficiency gain from designing one part of the system without distor-
tions if distortions are then placed elsewhere to accomplish insurance and redis-
tributive goals . . . even if the change leaves one part with no deviation from
actuarial principles. . . . A pension system that includes poverty relief will be
distorting; minimizing distortions implies minimizing poverty relief (Barr and
Diamond 2009, 7, 13).
In the context of policy learning, it is significant that a recent change to the Chilean
pension model, namely the introduction of the basic social pension, has so far not fea-
tured in the Nigerian debate. A case in point was a conference on pension reform in
the Nigerian capital in May 2009 that was organized to draw lessons from the first five
years of reform. The organizers invited a former director of the Chilean Pension Fund
regulatory body to address the meeting, but this retired official only mentioned the lat-
est Chilean policy changes in passing and did not focus on their potential relevance for
Nigeria (Del Campo 2009). The remainder of this paper will argue that Nigeria should
learn relevant lessons from Chile and other countries with established or emerging
basic social pension systems, rather than trying to leapfrog between developmental
stages in social and economic policy-making.
PENSION REFORM IN NIGERIA
As in other countries of sub-Saharan Africa, pension issues in Nigeria have a fairly
limited relevance for the country’s social protection system. The demographic profile
of the population is weighted toward young people and older people mostly rely on
informal provisions for survival in old age. Formal social security, including pension
provision, is limited to the formal sector of employment, such as the civil service in
each of the three levels of government (federal, state, and local), the military, and pub-
lic enterprises (parastatals). In spite of low coverage rates in relation to the overall size
of the Nigerian workforce, many pension systems existed in parallel before the 2004
reform. There were special schemes for public servants of the Nigerian federation, the
(federal) police, security services, and the military. In addition, each of the 36 states,
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plus the capital territory, had a separate pension scheme for its public servants, as did
each of the 774 local government authorities. These public sector pension schemes
were non-contributory and unfunded (Casey and Dostal 2008, 244).
By contrast, before the 2004 reform, the formal private sector was covered by a
pay-as-you-go pension scheme, the Nigerian Social Insurance and Trust Fund
(NSITF). However, its scope and coverage were more limited than those of public-
sector schemes. Only some larger enterprises offered access to the scheme and, since
its foundation in 1994, the NSITF’s accumulated capital and pension payouts were
low while administrative costs were high (ILO 2006). The resulting pattern of pension
provisions was highly fragmented, and the available data suggest that only 10 percent
of the Nigerian workforce (about 4.8 million out of about 48 million) belonged to the
formal employment sector, out of which about 3.7 million also belonged to a pension
scheme (Casey and Dostal 2008, 245).
The 2004 pension reform did not significantly expand the scope of pension provi-
sions in comparison to the pre-reform period. Although data on pensions under the old
systems and the new system are difficult to compare, it took until the first quarter of
2010 to register 4.1 million subscribers to the new system of retirement savings
accounts, which was only slightly above the pre-reform level, although the Nigerian
workforce had expanded (Pension Commission 2010). This slow growth in coverage
was partly due to the reluctance of private-sector employers to join the new scheme.
Another significant factor was that state and local legislatures were hesitant to emulate
the federal legislation for pension reform, and most of the 36 Nigerian states still do
not comply with the provisions of the new system.
Shortcomings of the pre-2004 Nigerian pension systems, such as the existence of
large-scale unfunded entitlements under the defined-benefit pension scheme for civil
servants, matched by large-scale arrears of pension payments in all sectors of the sys-
tem, were one reason the reform was undertaken. However, the more prominent line
of reasoning was that pension reform should allow Nigeria to follow the Chilean
model of providing long-term capital to develop financial markets and improve eco-
nomic growth.
This reasoning is clear from a number of high-profile reports issued by subsequent
Nigerian governments. Mention of the main features of the 2004 pension reform pro-
ject can be found as early as 1997 in the Vision 2010 document of the then military
government. It stated that “by the year 2010 most Nigerians shall have access to some
form of social protection offered by the formal Social Security Program” (Pension
Subcommittee 1997, 45). After the military regime gave up power and a civilian gov-
ernment was elected in 1999, the new administration put forward its own program for
economic and political renewal, termed the National Economic Empowerment and
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Development Strategy (NEEDS). This document referred only in passing to pension
reform but reiterated the view that the reform might help to develop Nigerian capital
markets (Nigerian National Planning Commission 2004, 114). Another characteristic
statement from the same period suggests that pension reform
has created a platform for the realization of all other reform programs of the
Federal Government of Nigeria. Without long term funds, there can be no sig-
nificant development in the much needed . . . sectors that would promote eco-
nomic growth. In the short term, the regulations [on pension reform] seek to
point to the need for the proactive and rapid development of the capital market
through the creation of quality investment outlets for different asset classes to
absorb these long term funds being accumulated for the first time in the financial
history of Nigeria (Henshaw 2006, 7-8).
However, international financial institutions such as the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank did not offer any significant support for the country’s
pension reform. The Fund engaged in two technical assistance missions to estimate
pension arrears of the pre-reform pension system in the context of a “policy support
instrument” but offered no direct financial assistance. The Bank originally offered
Nigeria a technical assistance program to improve economic reform and governance
in general, which included funding for a pension reform component. This funding was
not paid out, but was subsequently shifted to address Nigerian aviation safety (World
Bank 2009).
One might detect three main explanations for the decision to enact the 2004 pen-
sion reform: (1) unfunded pension promises under the pre-reform defined-benefit sys-
tem for civil servants resulted in quickly growing pension entitlements that the gov-
ernment was unable or unwilling to fund; (2) the example of Chile suggested that pen-
sion reform might significantly improve the functioning of Nigerian financial markets;
and (3) the government hoped that pension reform would add to the credibility of the
general economic reform effort, since funding pensions would help to put the Nigerian
federal budget on a fiscally sustainable footing (IMF 2005, 66).
As far as the first objective of pension financing is concerned, the reform required
civil servants and public-sector employees to contribute to the system for the first
time, withholding 7.5 percent of salary (an amount matched by the employer), while
the contributions of private-sector workers, which were previously collected by the
NSITF, were raised from 3.5 percent to 7.5 percent. The contributions of private-sec-
tor employers were increased in parallel from 6 percent to 7.5 percent. Members of the
armed forces were exempted from this funding formula: they must contribute only 2.5
percent, while 12.5 percent is contributed on their behalf by the government.2
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The management and investment of contributions is conducted by pension fund
administrators (PFAs), while the money is held in trust by pension fund custodians
(PFCs), both in accordance with the Chilean model.3 The system is regulated by the
Nigerian Pension Commission (PenCom), which mirrors the Chilean regulatory body
(the Superintendency) and is responsible for approving PFAs and PFCs and for setting
rules governing investment portfolios.
Under the new system, the replacement rate of future pension benefits in relation to
wages is uncertain. Some simulation exercises by IMF and World Bank suggest that
the replacement rate will be about 40 percent of final wages or salary in the case of a
30-year contribution record—much lower than under the former public- and private-
sector schemes, which admittedly often went unpaid (Casey and Dostal 2008, 249).
Other problematic features of the new system concern the decision to make low-wage
earners pay full contribution rates and the failure to clarify the value and financing of a
minimum pension, which the Pension Reform Act of 2004 (National Assembly of the
Federal Republic of Nigeria 2004) provides for but which still remained undefined in
2010. In addition, the authorities at all levels of the Nigerian state have failed to deal
with existing pension arrears deriving from the earlier pension systems, which are
believed to have reached record highs in 2009 (Nzeshi 2009).
Following elections in 2007, the current Nigerian government engaged in a plethora
of new policy initiatives to expand the earlier National Economic Empowerment and
Development Strategy agenda.4 Most significantly, the government put forward a new
policy-making framework called Vision 2020 that, just like Vision 2010 (proposed in
1997), was based on analysis of the major subsectors of the Nigerian economy. A num-
ber of the 25 working reports informing Vision 2020 did make reference to pension
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2. The Nigerian parliament recently considered proposals to exclude members of the Nigerian
armed forces from the scope of the 2004 Pension Reform Act and to set up a separate
scheme for military personnel (Tsan 2010).
3. An exception to the World Bank’s hesitation to endorse Nigeria’s reform is a report
describing the Pension Reform Act as “basically sound in terms of the transparency and
accountability of pension fund operations” (World Bank 2007, 43). However, this could be
read as a defense of the original Chilean blueprint. The report noted on the same page that
expected collections for the new Nigerian pension system should be much higher than was
actually the case and that “reasons for this discrepancy are unclear.”
4. In addition to Vision 2020, which aspires to turn Nigeria into one of the “20 largest
economies in the world” by 2020, these initiatives concern a seven-point presidential agenda,
a National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy II agenda, and the Com-
merce 44 agenda on turning 44 Nigerian non-oil goods into export commodities (Orakwue
2009, ch. 4).
reform in passing, and one—the document on finance—offered for the first time some
analysis of the outcome of the reform efforts to date (Nigerian National Planning
Commission 2009). However, pension reform was downgraded in the new govern-
ment’s discourse, and emphasis shifted toward other issues, such as efforts to develop
Nigerian export industries. Shortly thereafter, crisis management was forced upon the
financial sector, as the country’s stock market crashed in 2008 and the banking sector
faced large-scale instability in 2009. The following sections examine the debate on
funded pensions in Nigeria, the potential or otherwise of social pensions to offer an
alternative to the funded system in the Nigerian context, and the first six years of prac-
tical experience with pension reform.
FUNDED PENSIONS IN THE NIGERIAN POLITICAL ECONOMY
In the Nigerian case, analysis of how compulsory individual funded pensions
might affect national savings levels and economic growth must be read against con-
ventional wisdom. This is necessary in at least two respects. First, increased savings
rates might not be desirable in a very poor country. Given the lack of basic social secu-
rity in the present, forced saving for the future might not be rational or desirable either
for individuals or for society at large. Using funded pensions to develop the Nigerian
financial market to provide long-term funding for productive investment and higher
growth in the future is an experiment rather than a precondition for development in the
present.
The most urgent issue in terms of how to accumulate resources for future develop-
ment is to address the failure of the country’s political and economic power holders to
turn resource endowments into developmental gain for ordinary Nigerians. Short-term
improvements in basic services and in creating preconditions for future economic
development, such as the provision of electricity and treated water, might be available
in a direct manner rather than through the detour of developing Nigerian capital mar-
kets. Some countries, such as China, might provide infrastructure in exchange for oil,
and basic social security could be financed from outside at limited cost by rich donor
countries (Clunies-Ross and Huq 2009).
Second, even if increased national savings and more developed capital markets
were desirable in Nigeria, the existing scholarship on funded pensions points toward
various barriers to achieving these objectives in low-income countries. Thus, it must
be stressed that the academic literature does not offer support for funded pensions in
the context of developing countries with a GDP as low as Nigeria’s (Davis 1995, ch.
11; Barr and Diamond 2008, 94-110, 159-73; Barr and Diamond 2009, 24-25).5 The
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literature suggests a very close link between GDP per capita and the development of
financial markets. It is held to be impossible to skip stages in the build-up of regulatory
capabilities, and financial market development must be advanced enough to allow for
funded pensions to contribute to the system.
On the other hand, some authors have also pointed to the potential of contractual
savings, such as funded pensions, to be more beneficial in developing rather than
developed countries (Davis and Hu 2006, 206). However, this literature uses the term
“developing countries” for countries that are more advanced than Nigeria, and the
sample is too limited to allow for any generalization (Catalan et al. 2000, 28-30).6
Thus, if regulation is poor and promising investment opportunities are limited,
enforced long-term saving might fail to develop financial markets.
In addition, contributions to individual funded accounts can affect national savings
and the rate of growth in different ways. They do not need to increase (and might even
decrease) national savings if assets are primarily invested in newly created govern-
ment bonds. Placing these bonds into individual accounts only increases public debt.
On the other hand, savings might increase if existing bonds are purchased from the
public (the difference between “narrow” and “broad” funding) (Holzmann and Hinz
2005, 93; Barr and Diamond 2008, 95-97).
In the Nigerian context, one can expect a mismatch between the accumulation of
pension savings and the failure to find appropriate investment outlets that would pro-
duce real returns to pension savers. Some of the relevant problems with the funded
pension system in the Nigerian context are outlined in table 1.
Nigerian Pension Reform 2004-2010 21
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5. Due to higher oil prices, Nigeria has been classified by the World Bank as a lower-middle-
income country rather than a low-income country. However, a large gap in development
continues to exist between Nigeria and countries with a more developed financial market
(such as South Africa).
6. For example, in their frequently quoted study, Catalan et al. acknowledged that their sam-
ple of developing countries consisted of only three cases including Chile, and that the other
two (Malaysia and Singapore) “exhibit little if any causality between institutions and mar-
kets” (Catalan et al. 2000, 29).
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Table 1. Selected Problems of Nigerian Funded Pensions
Problem Applicable Feedback from practical experience 2004-2010to Nigeria?
Problems affecting institutions
Pension authority’s limited regulatory Yes Doubt was expressed by observers.
capability
Poor data gathering and management Yes Doubt was expressed by observers.
Instability of the banking system Yes There was a large-scale crisis in the Nigerian banking 
sector in 2009.
Political interference with investment Possibly The president’s “seven points” suggested using pension 
decisions savings for house building.
Limit in the number of asset classes Yes Pension regulators’ guidelines limit investment to 
available for investment domestic government and bank money instruments and 
some domestic equity.
High transition costs in moving from Yes Pension arrears of pre-2004 unfunded public sector 
old unfunded defined-benefit system defined-benefit schemes reached record levels in 2009. 
and pay-as-you-go system (NSITF) Additional costs arose from transferring existing NSITF 
to funded pensions pension claims into the new system.
Problems affecting individual savers
Doubtful credibility of future pension Yes Large-scale efforts to avoid contributions by workers 
promises and employers were reported.
Inadequate returns on low-yielding Possibly Very limited reliable data are available, but a small (less 
assets than 20 percent) equity share of investment is said to 
have contributed 50 percent of overall returns until the 
2008 Nigerian stock market crash.
Returns threatened by high Yes Charges levied by pension fund administrators, pension 
management charges fund custodians and the Pension Commission were very 
high by international standards; they were reduced from 
3 percent to 2.25 percent in the second quarter of 2009.
Returns threatened by high rate Possibly The average consumer price inflation between 2004 
of inflation and 2009 was 11.7 percent per year.
Frequent change in labor market Yes Nigerian data point to frequent changes in labor market 
status questions build-up of status between the formal and informal sectors.
significant sums in individual accounts
Notes: For column one, see Davis 1995, Davis and Hu 2006, and Barr and Diamond 2008. For columns two and three, see further
references in the sections below. For the Nigerian annual inflation rate, see IMF data quoted at: http://www.indexmundi.
com/nigeria/inflation_rate_(consumer_prices).html; for data on pension account charges, see http://www.ibtcpension.
com/pn/200906.pdf.
The inherent problems of introducing funded pension systems and the recent
changes in Chile both suggest that potential alternatives should be examined. There-
fore, the next section focuses on the case of non-contributory social pensions as a
potential policy-making alternative for Nigeria.
NIGERIA AND THE GLOBAL DEBATE ON SOCIAL PENSIONS
Over the last ten years or so, agendas of basic social security have increasingly
influenced international organizations and global debates on economic development.
Advocacy for basic social security—with social pensions as one potential policy
instrument—originated in the International Labour Organization (ILO) and later influ-
enced the IMF, OECD, United Nations Development Programme, World Bank and
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (Toye and Toye 2005, 7-9;
Standing 2008, 19-21). In 2009, the ILO and other UN agencies launched a campaign
known as Initiative VI, demanding a “social protection floor” defined as “a set of basic
social rights, services and facilities that the global citizen should enjoy” (ILO 2010).
The campaign responded to the current global economic crisis and has covered aspects
such as normative issues, the building of state capabilities, and empirical modeling of
expected costs of basic social security in different developing countries.7 Due to exten-
sive traffic in expertise and personnel between different international organizations,
these ideas have become broadly accepted, although implementation, where it exists,
appears to have preceded the recent debate.
One should note that basic social security agendas pursue growth and competitive-
ness by focusing on the question of how very poor people can start participating in
markets in the first place. In other words, these policies might help to expand the
scope of the global market economy by addressing some of the social deprivation that
is linked with the breakup of earlier forms of social reproduction. The provision of
basic social security in low-income countries is thereby understood to exercise an
immediate effect on the political economy by adding to state stability and legitimacy.
Such policies serve to encourage developing countries to provide social services and
infrastructure in order to create “the right environment for entrepreneurial activity to
flourish” (Nicholas Stern, quoted in Cammack 2006, 334).
In marked contrast to Chile’s role in the debate on funded pensions in the 1990s, no
model country for the provision of basic social security has emerged. The most obvi-
ous candidate to serve as such a model would be South Africa, since social pensions,
Nigerian Pension Reform 2004-2010 23
The Korean Journal of Policy Studies
7. For additional information, see the ILO Web site. http://www.socialsecurityextension.org.
together with other basic social security policies, have been made available to most of
the country’s pensioners. However, South Africa is a poor model in the current context
since the country’s extremely high Gini index of 57.8, as compared to Nigeria’s 42.9,
makes it one of the most unequal societies in the world (World Bank 2010).8 In addi-
tion, during the last stages of the apartheid regime, the country shifted its former pay-
as-you-go public sector pension scheme to full funding, thereby triggering high transi-
tion costs and an explosion of state debt, in which most of the pension savings are
invested (Hendricks 2008, 6, 17-20).9
Yet the absence of a model has not stopped advocates of basic social security from
addressing a large variety of potential applications and country cases. In the case of
social pensions, defined as pure cash transfers to old people in which “eligibility criteria
do not include a history of earmarked contributions having been made by the individual
in question” (Palacios and Sluchynsky 2006, 8), the main issue is the scope of provi-
sions and affordability issues. This concerns the relationship between social pensions
and the broader social security system (if the latter exists), the relative contribution of
social pensions to household income levels as opposed to other sources of income, and
the size of the social pension in relation to average earnings. In this context, a number
of developing and transition countries can be identified in which social pensions con-
tribute significantly to the income of older people (Palacios and Sluchynsky 2006, 10).
However, these countries—South Africa, Mauritius, Namibia, Botswana, Brazil and
Bolivia—all exhibit levels of development, as measured in GDP per capita based on
purchasing power parity (PPP), at least twice as high as Nigeria’s.10
This casts some doubt on the potential of a social pension policy in the Nigerian
case and leads back to questions of affordability and policy design. First, judgment on
affordability depends on assumptions about the level of benefits granted, such as uni-
versalism of entitlement versus targeting and whether or not social pensions should be
packaged with additional social policies. Most studies assume that social pensions
should be part of a package of basic social security together with child benefits, dis-
ability pensions, and basic health care. They also assume that developing countries
24 Nigerian Pension Reform 2004-2010
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8. The World Bank’s Gini index is based on national data from South Africa (2000) and
Nigeria (2004).
9. In fact, South Africa might serve as a negative model, since its spending share on social
pensions is very small in comparison to the costs of its transition to full funding.
10. The country closest to Nigeria in terms of GDP (PPP) per capita, according to the latest
available figures (IMF World Economic Outlook Database, April 2010, data for 2009), is
Bolivia ($4,455, compared to Nigeria’s $2,249). The average GDP (PPP) per capita of the
group of six developing and transition countries with large-scale social pensions was
$9,724, more than four times as high as Nigeria’s.
would be assisted in their financing of provisions by OECD donor countries willing to
redirect and increase their spending on aid (ILO 2008).11
Nevertheless, initial country conditions and administrative capabilities will deter-
mine the potential of social pensions to contribute to social security. For example, one
of the rare estimates of potential costs of social redistribution focusing on Nigeria
posed the question how much the richest fifth of the population would have to con-
tribute in taxes as a proportion of their disposable income to move all Nigerians above
a one- or two-dollar income threshold. It has been suggested that costs would be
exceptionally high in comparison to all other countries under review for the one-dollar
threshold and would demand the virtual appropriation of all disposable income of the
richest fifth to meet the two-dollar threshold (Clunies-Ross and Huq 2009). In addi-
tion, attempts to limit expenditure by targeting social pensions in a non-universal man-
ner would result in very high administrative costs relative to overall spending levels
(Behrendt and Hagemejer 2009, 106).12 Thus, the issue of funding remains paramount
in assessing the viability of introducing social pensions.
In the Nigerian case, it also is appropriate to ask about the role of sequencing in the
expansion of social policies. The Vision 2010 document referred to above, for exam-
ple, suggested that Nigeria should be able to provide some form of formal social secu-
rity to the majority of its citizens by 2010 (Pension Subcommittee 1997). It is obvious
that this target has been missed; more importantly, there has not even been a move in
the right direction. As for pensions, the share of workers covered has not been expand-
ed by the 2004 reform and might have declined further. The reformed system contin-
ues to exclude the poor and workers in the informal sector. Furthermore, federal, state,
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11. At present, ILO costing studies exist for seven African and five Asian developing countries.
However, the current author and two ILO experts could not identify any costed studies for
the case of Nigeria (personal communication, August 27 and 29, 2009). A recent World
Bank study of social pensions also does not cover the Nigerian case (Holzmann et al.
2009).
12. In particular, assumptions about how to procure funding for basic social security might be
more problematic for certain countries. For the case of universal social and disability pen-
sions, ILO studies assume that the level would be set at 30 percent of GDP per capita, with
a maximum of one dollar (PPP) per day as a cut-off point (ILO 2008). This suggests very
high costs in countries like Nigeria, in which many people live below the one dollar (PPP)
per day threshold, and in which wealth and the wealthy tend to exit the country. Thus, the
financing problem in Nigeria is due to the fact that most of the domestic population lives
below the one dollar threshold, and many of the better-off live not much above it. This
explains the extraordinarily high cost estimates of Clunies-Ross and Huq (2009) for basic
social security in the Nigerian case, which require further investigation.
and local government employees might see the high deductions from their salaries for
the funded pension system as another tax and might resist the new system in various
ways.
Social pensions, on the other hand, might be the only available policy instrument to
increase formal social security in the short and medium term. They have been credited
with effects such as improving women’s health, supporting the rural poor, heightening
the status of older people in the family, and increasing school enrolment (Johnson and
Williamson 2006). However, social pensions also have some disadvantages. In the
Nigerian case, social pensions would be reliant upon the same revenue base—oil rents
distributed by the Nigerian federal government among the 36 states according to a
constitutionally fixed funding formula—as the old, unfunded pension scheme. It
would merely involve an alternate way of distributing government revenue, channel-
ing it away from elites to broader sections of the population. Thus, the instability of
the revenue source would remain and the danger of arrears in payments would not be
removed. Moreover, the administrative capacity of state and local governments to
establish eligibility for social pensions and to deliver such a system would be in doubt.
Nevertheless, social pensions do offer advantages not available through other policy
choices. Distributing some of the revenue of Nigeria’s oil wealth in an equal manner
between richer and poorer states would help the federal government gain more legiti-
macy. In all likelihood, social pensions could constitute the next step in the country’s
evolution, while becoming the lowest-GDP-per-capita country on earth with a system
of funded private pensions means entering uncharted territory.
THE FIRST SIX YEARS OF NIGERIAN PENSION REFORM
This section explores Nigeria’s six years of practical reform experience since the
passing of the federal Pension Reform Act in 2004 as follows: (1) a review of the debate
on the outcome of pension reform within Nigeria; (2) a review of the role of PFAs;
and (3) a survey of some features of the banking system, stock market, and other
macroeconomic issues that might influence the funded pension system.13
The outcome of pension reform within Nigeria raises two main issues. On the one
hand, the government and the Pension Commission (PenCom) have abandoned their
earlier frequent references to the Chilean model. On the other hand, debate has
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13. This paper does not provide an analysis of recent pension reform at the state and local levels.
It might be assumed, however, that the experience at the federal level is likely to be repli-
cated at lower levels of the Nigerian federation.
become focused on how the assembled pension savings might be used for productive
investment. However, deliberation has so far failed to produce new insights to enable
future action. Regarding the government’s own assessment of pension reform, a con-
ference in Abuja on May 19 and 20, 2009, demonstrated a lack of direction (Pension
Commission 2009).
The last Nigerian president appears to have conceded the point that the funded pen-
sion system would need to be supplemented with unfunded social pensions to assist
the large majority of Nigerian workers outside of the formal sector of employment.14
According to one source, he told the Abuja conference that “Nigeria [needs] to consider
a non-contributory pension scheme (social pension) currently being operated aside the
new scheme for the purpose of addressing the problems facing it” (Global Action on
Aging 2009).15 However, the conference did not focus on the issue, and the parallel
introduction of social pensions in Chile was not discussed. Instead, nearly all presenta-
tions concerned attempts to find alternative future investment opportunities, such as
general comments about public-private partnerships, which appeared to lack rele-
vance. The only clear point was a focus on using pension savings for future invest-
ment in housing, but it remained unclear why pension savings rather than direct gov-
ernment investment were needed.
Apart from the conference, debate about the new pension system was also taking
place in the context of the president’s “seven points,” also known as the Nigeria Pro-
ject Agenda, and in preparing the Agenda 2020. The seven points essentially recom-
mended altering the investment guidelines for PFAs in favor of the real sector and
low-cost housing schemes. The report presented Brazil and Jamaica as positive exam-
ples and criticized the existing investment guidelines as too narrow (Government of
Nigeria 2008, 5, 36-37). However, this suggestion was quickly dropped and did not
feature in subsequent government announcements. This left the Agenda 2020 working
group on finance to express “concerns about [lack of] sufficient depth in the capital
market to effectively absorb the available and expected pension funds without causing
a glut and overvaluation of existing capital market securities” (Nigerian National Plan-
ning Commission 2009, 43-44; see also World Bank 2007, 43-44). The same group
also stressed that high transaction costs could erode investment appreciation. As for
solutions, the report was silent. The problem of lack of suitable investment outlets
therefore remains the crucial policy-making dilemma (Stewart and Yermo 2009, 25).
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14. President Umaru Yar’Adua, the 13th Nigerian head of state, died in office on May 5, 2010.
15. Another source suggested that the late president did not support social pensions but warned
instead of corruption in unfunded schemes in general terms (Josiah 2009). A written record
of the actual remarks made at the conference is not available.
In this context, analysis must now turn to the role of the pension fund administrators
(PFAs) at the core of the funded pension system. Their ability to manage contributions
over time in a manner that produces real returns to savers after inflation and deduction
of management fees determines future pensioners’ economic prospects. In the Nigerian
regulatory system, PenCom issues guidelines on the maximum share of investment
that PFAs are allowed to take out in different asset classes—government bonds, money
market instruments issued by domestic banks, and selected domestic equities—and the
pension fund custodian (PFC) holds savings on trust to separate asset holdings from
the PFA’s investment function. For their services, PenCom and the PFC each receive a
share of the management fee, which used to amount overall to 3 percent and was cut
to 2.25 percent in the second quarter of 2009. Currently, 1.6 percent goes to the PFA,
0.4 percent to the PFC, and 0.25 percent to PenCom.
Judging from the proliferation of PFAs since the start of the reform, management
of Nigerian pension investments appears to be a good business proposition—at least
as far as the PFAs themselves are concerned. Since an earlier survey on October 23,
2007 (Casey and Dostal 2008, 254), the number of PFAs has proliferated from 13 to
26, and the number of PFCs has increased from four to five (data from Pension Com-
mission Web site, June 15, 2010). It is likely that the number of competing PFAs in the
small Nigerian market (with around four million subscribers) is, in relative terms, the
highest in the world.
In spite of the proliferation of PFAs, their competence must be questioned: they
appear to fail to provide their customers clear information about their investment strat-
egy. A survey of PFA Web sites conducted in September 2009 showed that many had
not been updated for at least two years. Moreover, virtually all companies were in
breach of PenCom guidelines to publish the rate of return of their Retirement Savings
Account (RSA) funds at the end of each financial year and to make the unit prices of
their RSA funds readily accessible online (Pension Commission n.d.a).16 In fact, only
14 PFAs (out of 26) provided any information about the value of their respective RSA
units on their Web sites (see table 2). Of these, seven offered out-of-date or undated
unit prices that lacked informational value. Of the seven that provided more recent
data, only three provided sufficient data to calculate approximate rates of return, and
only a single PFA provided full coverage of the value of the company’s RSA unit
since its inception, which allowed calculating the actual rate of return. The silence on
rates of return appears to be no coincidence; once inflation and management charges
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16. The PenCom regulation states that the PFAs were supposed to publish RSA fund rates of
return for the first time on December 31, 2007. Thus, it was issued either late in 2006 or in
2007 and has since been ignored.
are factored in, it appears to conceal negative returns. For the single case in which a
PFA provided sufficient information, the real rate of return after inflation and charges
between May 2, 2006, and September 2, 2009 can be calculated as negative. This is
significant, since the company in question has been an acknowledged industry
leader.17
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Table 2. Information Provided Online by 26 Licensed Nigerian Pension Fund Administrators
Information* Number of PFAs who provided it
Names of company personnel (management team and board of directors) 17
Ownership structure (shareholders) of the company 11
Current or recent (not older than one month) price of the RSA unit 7
Out-of-date or undated price of the RSA unit 7
Some long-term data to evaluate the development of the RSA unit over time 3
Complete set of long-term data to evaluate the development of the RSA unit 1
over time that allows calculation of the rate of return after inflation
Complete set of long-term data to evaluate the development of the RSA unit 0
over time that allows calculation of the rate of return after inflation and after 
deduction of management fees
Information was compiled during a survey of PFA Web sites on September 10-11, 2009.
* Of the 26 licensed PFAs, 25 had a Web site. Four of those Web sites were no longer functioning.
17. The PFA in question is run by IBTC, a South African bank, and received a prize from the
Nigerian newspaper This Day as pension fund manager of the year for 2009. The compa-
ny’s RSA unit started on May 2, 2006 at 1,000 naira and on September 2, 2009 (40 months
later) stood at 1,452 naira. A model calculation, assuming 11 percent consumer price infla-
tion on average over the duration and an annual charge of 3 percent for the first three years
and of 2.25 percent for the last four months, jointly levied by PFA, PFC and PenCom, sug-
gests a figure of 1,546 naira would be needed to beat inflation and charges. (The last four
months were calculated as a third of the above quoted annual figures—3.7 percent inflation
and 0.7 percent charges.) According to these assumptions, the actual rate of return was
negative once inflation and charges were factored in. It is possible that this calculation is
still too optimistic, however, since even in the case of the “fund manager of the year,” it is
not clear from the available figures how charges were accounted for in the valuation of the
RSA unit. Fees were also ignored in the only presentation on returns available on the Pen-
Com Web site (Okpaise 2009). An additional problem for the purposes of comparison is
that different PFAs started at different points in time to manage investments and their sub-
sequent RSA unit prices are not comparable. In sum, all PFAs would have to give actual
rates of return for each year, calculated as a share of a full business year in the case of the
first year, in order to allow pension savers an informed choice between administrators.
According to plausible assumptions, one must conclude in the case of all six remain-
ing PFAs with recent RSA unit figures that their returns have been negative and in at
least two cases highly negative. Since seven other PFAs provided only out-of-date or
undated figures (all pointing toward negative returns), and 12 provided no data at all, one
needs to suppose that the only successful participants in the system of funded accounts
are the PFA companies themselves. These estimates by this author would need to be
verified by making all the necessary data available for all 26 licensed PFAs. However,
PenCom has not acted to enforce its own regulations and, given its own lack of compli-
ance with regular reporting of activities, might not be in a position to complain.18
The issue of how PFAs perform leads directly to the larger question of how the bank-
ing system, stock market, and macroeconomic performance of the Nigerian economy
might interact with the funded pension system. Defenders of the current system would
argue that it is too early to make any claims about the failure of funded pensions to have
a positive impact on the economy. They would point to the global economic crisis and
the 2008 crash of the Nigerian stock market as unexpected events that explain negative
returns of PFAs but do not call into question the system’s fundamental viability. More-
over, the biggest losses of pension and social security funds on a global scale have been
sustained in OECD countries with highly developed financial markets, rather than in
developing countries (International Social Security Association 2009).
Nevertheless, one must also account for the domestic aspects of the Nigerian crisis,
as the country was once again unable to translate an unexpected hike in oil prices into
convincing economic results. Under the pre-2007 government, oil revenue was shifted
from the federal budget to an Excess Crude Account with unclear constitutional status
and hazy lines of accountability (Akintunde 2008). This newly created account worked
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18. The first PenCom annual report, covering 2007 and published in late 2008 (Pension Com-
mission n.d.b), did not provide any data on investment returns. As for investment policy,
the data for retirement savings accounts suggest that 60 percent of savings were held in
Federal Government of Nigeria securities and 21 percent in domestic money market instru-
ments while equity investment was around 16 percent. The second annual report, covering
2008 and issued in late 2009 (Pension Commission n.d.c), stated figures for the three main
asset categories of 56, 32 and 9 percent respectively. The 2008 report acknowledged over-
all negative returns and did not make any claims about positive results of pension savings
for the real economy. In addition, the report underlined that 60 percent of Federal Govern-
ment of Nigeria bonds (one zero is missing in the report’s figure) are allotted to pension
funds (Pension Commission n.d.c, 12-23). The language of the 2008 report suggested that
the estimates of negative returns presented here might be too low. Moreover, before the
2008 Nigerian stock market crash, equities had produced half of all the portfolio’s returns,
pointing to very low or negative returns for the remainder (Rewane 2009, 4).
to strengthen the position of the president, as did the creation and subsequent high pro-
file of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), closely linked with
the president’s office, which assumed the role of control mechanism of last resort in the
Nigerian polity. During the last oil boom, excess liquidity, the loose monetary policy of
the Central Bank of Nigeria, and the increased credit creation of private banks prepared
the scene for the subsequent crash. Excessive credit creation by private banks appears
to have been used to drive up banks’ own share prices and to provide extensive credit
for oil companies, which could no longer be served once oil prices dropped again.
In the second half of 2009, the Nigerian financial system was held to be close to
the breaking point due to nonperforming loans. On August 14, the new head of the
Central Bank of Nigeria took the initiative to have the bank act as lender of last resort,
providing a bailout of 400 billion naira (later 620 billion naira) to save five (later
eight) of the 25 major Nigerian banks (Abubakar and Ekundayo 2009; Casey 2009;
Komolafe 2010).19 The top managers of the banks in question were subsequently
arrested by the EFCC on 118 charges in “the biggest single arraignment made by the
EFCC since its inception in 2003” (Media and Publicity Unit 2009). According to the
pending charges, loans without adequate collateral of more than 700 billion naira had
been made by the banks in question, which according to EFCC prosecutors amounted
to “economic sabotage and threats to the economic health of the nation” (Media and
Publicity Unit 2009). One of the accused top managers, who had only recently been
elected as deputy chairman of the Nigerian Stock Exchange, managed to avoid arrest
by leaving the country. He accused the governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria of set-
tling old business conflicts by unleashing the EFCC against him, while other observers
suggested that the affair had seriously damaged the business reputation of all Nigerian
banks and challenged their viability (Aminu and Iriekpen 2009).
As far as the funded pension system is concerned, the lack of regulatory control of
the financial markets might damage the interests of savers in a number of ways. First,
the overall savings accumulated in contributions from workers and employers since
2006 amounted to 472 billion naira, according to PenCom (Alabadan 2009). This sum,
roughly equivalent to the first Central Bank of Nigeria bailout of five banks, is princi-
pally invested in government securities, money market instruments of private banks,
and, to a lesser extent, equities. In the case of a banking crisis, the safety of investments
would be questioned, while the Nigerian Stock Exchange recorded drastic losses in
comparison to its peak in 2008 (see table 3).
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19. According to a survey of Nigerian banks based on 2006 data, the eight institutions in ques-
tion ranked 1, 4, 6, 14, 15, 18, 23, and 25, out of 25 surveyed institutions, in terms of their
capital base (Nigeria Banking Bulletin, quoted in Becker et al. 2008, 20).
Thus, the only “safe” investment class for the pension system consists of Nigerian
federal government bonds. If government bonds produce returns that are higher than
the rate of inflation and management fees combined, the interests of savers might be
protected. If not, they are eroded by the shortfall. The outcome ultimately depends on
the type of macroeconomic management adopted; the expansionary monetary policies
in Nigeria cast doubt on the viability of this strategy. In fact, it is still the state’s public
debt policy that determines returns of the “private” pension system (Hermann 2009).
This state of affairs points to structural problems with funded pensions in general that
might also apply in more advanced economies.
CONCLUSION
None of the originally stated goals of the Nigerian pension reform have been
achieved so far. First, Nigeria continues to carry significant pension arrears from the
pre-2004 unfunded pension systems, and some sources suggest that unpaid pensions
have reached record highs. Second, the post-2004 funded pension system has not had
any significant impact on the development of Nigerian financial markets, since most
of the assets are held in government securities and domestic bank money instruments.
It is therefore funded only in the most narrow sense, due to a lack of other appropriate
investment outlets. Thus, no shift of savings toward the real sector could be observed.
(Indeed, the supporters of reform have not made any claims in this respect.) Third,
Nigeria’s macroeconomic credibility has declined. This was due to developments not
causally related to pension reform, but rather to factors such as the volatility in world
oil prices, the parceling off of oil income into special funds with unclear accountabili-
ty, an unsound monetary and banking system, and the world economic crisis. Overall,
the regulatory environment has failed to encourage interaction between pension
reform and economic reform, while problems of regulation within the new system,
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Table 3. Nigeria Stock Exchange All Share Index, January 2000-June 2010
2000-2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Year high 21.147.24 30.703.46 26.221.90 35.068.84 57.990.22 66.771.20 31.357.24 28.029.78*
Year low 5.253.50 20.272.91 20.682.37 23.144.13 33.163.94 28.085.01 19.803.60 20.838.90†
Sources: O. Ogunyemi, Investment Analyst, available at: http://www.docstoc.com/docs/6764814/Technical-Review-of-The-
Nigerian-Stock-Exchange-(All-Share-Index)-as-at-June-2-2009. Most recent data available at: http://www.
proshareng.com.
* Figure given is as of April 19, 2010.
† Figure given is as of January 4, 2010.
such as the lack of transparency of PFAs about their investment returns and fees, have
also called the credibility of the reform into question.
Most importantly, the 2004 reform has failed to allow for coverage of workers out-
side of the formal sector of employment. As it now stands, the funded pension system
is isolated from larger social security concerns. It only caters to the needs of workers in
the formal employment sector, and it does even that poorly. Policy-making efforts are
now focused on finding long-term investment outlets for forced pension savings in
financial markets that are not mature enough to absorb such funds. It is here that the
costs of trying to copy the inappropriate Chilean pension model become most apparent.
In order to address the current shortcomings, a new direction in Nigerian policy-
making regarding pensions would be necessary, changing the agenda toward basic
social pensions to increase coverage rates and to introduce redistributive and solidarity
features into the system. Such policies would have to be combined with broader basic
social security objectives along the lines suggested by the ILO and other international
bodies (Ehmke and Skaletz 2009). In addition, basic social security schemes in other
sub-Saharan African countries, at stages of economic and social development similar
to Nigeria’s, would need to be studied in greater detail to draw relevant lessons. Such a
new course would have immediate benefits, address the issue of economic develop-
ment from the grass roots, and improve on the current promise of a “great leap” that is
likely to remain a mirage.
The Nigerian case has largely been ignored in the analysis of global pension policy.
It has hardly featured in the emerging discourse on the basic social security agenda.
This is a critical shortcoming. Explaining how countries with multiple barriers to suc-
cessful social development such as Nigeria could engage with a basic social security
agenda—with social pensions as one core element—determines whether or not the
agenda has any chance to influence future policy-making. Understanding that basic
social security will not come about as a result of economic development at some
future point, but rather is itself a necessary precondition for future economic develop-
ment, as argued by the ILO, is therefore a crucial first step.
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